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BOOK REVIEW
Imperatives of Culture and Race for
Understanding Human Rights Law:
Human Rights: A Political and Cultural
Critique Makau Mutua
HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE. By
Makau Mutua. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002. Pp.
264. $49.95.
HENRY J. RICHARDSON IIIt
INTRODUCTION
It has been nearly three decades that a school of legal
scholars, mostly of color in the United States, began to
write that the struggle for racial justice had never been di-
vorced from good legal theory and jurisprudence. This
struggle always had encompassed the necessity of peoples
of color becoming jurisprudential producers of the law gov-
erning the communities where they live, and not remain
content to be subject to such law only as jurisprudential
consumers. Now, sufficient freedom of scholarly spirit had
been won through political struggle to define this necessity.
Professor Mari Matsuda's insight-that the most effective
form of public power is that delivered form of reasoning
t Professor of Law, Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law. I am
most grateful to the excellent research assistance of Eleanor Breslin, J.D.
expected 2004. All opinions and deficits remain my own.
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which produces principles so deeply internalized and be-
yond public debate that they just "are"'-is irrefutable as a
keystone of the foundation on which Critical Race Theory
(CRT) scholars stand.
For understandable, if limiting reasons, CRT began its
work within national parameters in the United States.
However, its quest was, from the beginning, as equally
valid and significant for the international community as it
was for the North American community. Thus it was only a
matter of time-a short time-before the racial justice of in-
ternational law and jurisprudence came under its stringent
gaze. Such extension had a long historical runway: the
works of George Washington Williams, W.E.B. Du Bois,
Paul Robeson, George Padmore, C.L.R. James, Rayford
Logan, followed by Ralph Bunche, Clyde Ferguson, Goler
Butcher, and from Africa, Mohammed Bedjaoui, T.O. Elias,
F.X. Njenga, and, more recently, Shadrack Gutto. This is
only a partial list of those who, for more than a century, de-
fined the Black International Tradition. In doing so, they
questioned in liberationist, informed and precise ways the
racial justice of European-derived international jurispru-
dence and law, particularly around the right of all peoples
to be free of colonialism and similar racial domination.
Now, along with others, such as Adrien Wing, Elizabeth
Iglesias, Natsu Saito, Ruth Gordon, and Antony Anghie-
again, only a partial list-Makau Mutua is defining the
next phase of the CRT assessment of international law as
the law of the international community, where two thirds of
its population comprises people of color. This book is only
one of Professor Mutua's prominent efforts in this regard. It
is preceded and accompanied by his formidable resume, in-
cluding human rights fact-finding missions and studies into
several regions of Africa, as well as institutionalized human
rights leadership at Harvard University and in Africa. In
addition, Mutua has not only monitored elections in South
Africa and elsewhere, but has also written several articles
on international rights questions as they bear on African
governance, religion, and culture. Mutua presently holds
the well-deserved status of notable law professor at the
University at Buffalo Law School, and is the founder of its
human rights program. Most recently, Mutua was a notable
1. See Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness
Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763 (1990).
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participant in the current Kenyan constitution-drafting
process, serming as author of its proposal for a Kenyan
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
In subjecting international human rights law to his ex-
perienced gaze, Mutua is too modest when he describes
himself in his Introduction to the Book as merely "an in-
sider-outsider" regarding the law of human rights. Though
seemingly accurate as far as it goes, such description does
not explain Mutua's prominence in international human
rights scholarship, nor does it illuminate his virtually
unique role among CRT scholars in international law. For
the latter, Mutua fully mobilizes his strong credentials to
bring African-especially East African-human rights per-
spectives to American human rights jurisprudence through
the CRT lens. In doing so, Mutua continues to be an impor-
tant leader in pushing CRT scholars to explore questions of
race and international law. The present book, in appraising
international human rights law with a precise African-cul-
ture beam through the CRT lens, enhances his leadership
and gives us a rich agenda of legal and cultural questions
about protecting human rights for future guidance.
I. MUTUA'S GENERAL NARRATIVE
Following his introduction, which is revealing for its
linking incidents about colonialism and religion from his
African childhood to the genesis of this book, Professor
Mutua unrolls his book in six rich chapters, all of which
challenge in various ways western liberal human rights
perspectives: "Human Rights as a Metaphor;" "Human
Rights as an Ideology;" "Human Rights and the African
Fingerprint;" "Human Rights, Religion, and Proselytism;"
"The African State, Human Rights, and Religion;" "The
Limits of Rights Discourse;" and a useful "Conclusion."
Throughout, his writing is clear, and his critiques of west-
ern assumptions and paradoxes about the prescription and
implementation in other cultures of human rights law are
generally fine-tuned.
His chapter on "Human Rights and the African Finger-
print" is a first-rate exploration of the cross-cultural dialec-
tic between the notions of "rights" and "duties" in human
rights law, and a valuable discussion of the major contribu-
tions, not only from the African Charter, but also from
African cultures to this essential dialectic.
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A major focus in this work is American axioms about
human rights doctrines. As Mutua frequently demon-
strates, they have contrary results among local peoples, for
example in Africa, or fail to address their major human
rights concerns either through the right's prescription or its
implementation including through non-governmental or-
ganizations. Respectful but thorough critiques of the work
of leading American human rights legal scholars are
prominent here, particularly to show how their perspectives
and lines of argument furnish a basis for western actions of
legal and political domination through the human rights
process. Mutua's Chapter 1, "Human Rights as a
Metaphor," powerfully develops the argument that their
work, along with other conventional western liberal human
rights approaches and interpretations, continues to incorpo-
rate the old colonial metaphor of the "savior" addressing the
African "savage." Such metaphor often lays the foundation
for quite intrusive Western intervention into African states
and marginalizes, as against Western universalization,
both traditional and modern African human rights perspec-
tives and cultures. His development of these themes, gener-
ally not touched by most legal scholars--especially those in
the West-makes for bracing, controversial, and even harsh
analysis.
However, Mutua is not diving into an uncritical, cul-
tural relativism. Rather, he is trying to establish "another
way"2 that is more reflective of the world community's cul-
tural diversities. This approach falls somewhere between a
comparatively uncritical, western-focused, global univer-
salism in human rights legal doctrine and decisions, which
incorporates assumptions about dominance and subservi-
ence, and a cultural relativism allowing all particular
governments-invoking-cultural norms to substitute their
own norms, irrespective of bad consequences, to the welfare
of vulnerable peoples. The latter stance has been adopted at
times in the last decade by some Asian governments.
Mutua does indeed establish a 'floor' of fundamental
human rights, such as equal respect, human dignity, and
2. "Middle way" carries too much distorting baggage here, including fre-
quent American policymaking in international conflicts to invent "middle ways"
or "moderate options" in overseas political transitions which exist only through
American power possibly imposing them at much local cost, for questionable
foreign policy objectives. For example, American policy in Haiti including and
following its apparent removal of President Aristide in April 2004.
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war crimes, which should be protected as essentially non-
derogable. However, within this framework, Mutua aggres-
sively confronts the age-old fundamental intersection in
international human rights law: that between the
prescription and authority of universal principles, rights,
duties, and prohibitions, and the inevitable necessity on the
ground, where the people whose rights they are live, adapt,
accommodate, tailor in various ways the enforcement of
these rights to local and national circumstances, in order,
hopefully, to make their protection as effective as possible.
In effect, Mutua is arguing, with an eye towards current
arguments of cultural relativism defending local govern-
ments and authorities against global directives, that thisjurisprudential intersection must be continually examined
to ensure that it is free from western-dominating assump-
tions of the inferiority of local rights perspectives, including
those arising out of traditional African cultures and other
similarly situated cultures.
This intersection must be examined not only through
doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis, but equally through
a continuing analysis of the international human rights
process in its decisions and allocations of material and
normative resources on a global, especially North-South,
basis.3 Here, Chapter 2, "Human Rights as an Ideology," is
particularly well-aimed. All of this makes for an approach
which tight-ropes the borderline between the preservation
of local cultural authority, with its factors of local domi-
nance, and possible abuses. For example, patriarchal domi-
nance over the rights and welfare of women, and the
postulate of free will linked to human dignity and
autonomy, gives individuals the right to be free of physical,
economic, spiritual, and even cultural abuse, such as
women claiming their universal right to equal and better
treatment against the enforcement of the cultural norms
under which they were born and raised. Mutua meets this
question by arguing well and forcefully that local cultural
traditions and norms, as against assumptions of western
3. The focus on North-South relations is justified inter alia because of the
continuing disparity between power, resources, and economic benefits that in
many ways shares and describes commonalities as between and within the
North-South hemispheres respectively. See generally NASSAU A. ADAMS, THE
NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1993); Raj Bhala,
Assessing the Modern Era of International Trade, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1647
(1998).
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prescriptive superiority, must play a larger role in the very
framing of these issues than they do now, and further, that
the global human rights process must be re-tailored to
ensure this larger role.
Around this illustrative issue emerges part of Mutua's
continual argument throughout the book: "Stepping back
from the current official human rights rhetoric would create
a new basis for calculating human dignity and identifying
ways and societal structures through which such dignity
could be protected or enhanced .... It would respect cul-
tural pluralism as a basis for finding common universality
on some issues."4 In a valuable example, he then illustrates:
With regard to the practice labeled female genital mutilation in
the West, for instance, such an approach would first excavate the
social meaning and the purposes of the practice as well as its
effects, and then investigate the conflicting positions over the
practice in that society. Rather than being subjected to demonizing
and finger-pointing, under the tutelage of outsiders and their local
ilk, the contending positions would be carefully examined and
compared to find ways of either modifying or discarding the
practice without making its practitioners hateful of their culture
and of themselves. The zealotry of the current rhetoric gives no
room for such a considered intracultural, or intercultural dialogue
and introspection.
5
In walking this path, Mutua does not really confront-but
neither have most other scholars-the basic question of
growing expectations that people, including women, have a
general right not to be harmed for almost any reason. I will
return to this shortly.
Additionally, this argument throughout the book fre-
quently raises the issue of destructive Western cultural in-
tervention into African and other Southern Tier cultures.
Mutua states that he is calling for "genuine cross-contami-
nation of cultures"' through the human rights process. In
doing so he seems to accept that outside intervention into
cultures is inevitable, and even may be desirable so long as
its modalities and authorizing legal doctrines can be strictly
controlled around a principle of equal respect for all cul-
4. MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 8
(2002).
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. Id.
[Vol. 52516
2004] UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
tures. In a sprawling, blooming, buzzing, globalized world of
not a little confusion, it remains to be seen whether
Mutua-and many of the rest of us legal scholars-are re-
posing too much faith in legal authority, even authority
standing on compelling norms incorporating cross cultural
commonalities (where Mutua is borrowing from Grotius), to
maintain that control. Relatively uncontrolled global as-
sessment by all cultures towards all other cultures might be
irretrievably out of the box, but it remains quite pertinent
in this regard that the West has the most capacity and re-
sources to project its media and its universities into and
onto the global community.
Finally, Mutua's emphasis on the importance of recon-
structing the human rights process so that diverse cultures
and their peoples do not descend into self-hatred is a prel-
ude for a deeper statement about legal authority, jurispru-
dence, and modernism, primarily in Africa. It is the
continuation of a critical inquiry about the reception of
outside laws and legal procedures into Africa, especially
their collisions with African customary law and traditional
authority. Mutua is not alone in arguing that, in order to be
effective and authoritative, any reception of outside laws
must rest on an African melding of those principles and
words with the authoritative customs and traditions of the
people at that time. Elegant and codified Western legal
texts will not take root without such melding taking place
in both prescribing content and implementing their applica-
tion on the African ground, with the melded outcomes
accepted as a successor to previous authoritative local cus-
tom. This entire book richly conveys this reality in a variety
of ways.
A dynamic feature of Mutua's discussion throughout his
Book is his refusal to shy away from prominent but conven-
tional dilemmas in human rights doctrine, at least from
Western perspectives, but rather to show a critical path to
resolving them. Thus, he comes down hard and affirma-
tively on the question of whether the human rights corpus
implies or represents Western-style national democratic
governance systems.7 He argues that the rejection of all
semblances of cultural relativism represents an attempt to
marginalize perspectives of peoples of color globally. He ar-
gues equally that the current Western trade and foreign
7. See id. at 39, 41, 58.
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policy goals, as wrapped into the human rights process of
privileging political and civil rights over the effective reali-
zation of economic, social, and cultural rights in the human
rights corpus, stems from the attempted dominance of
Western over Eastern states, as well as contributes to the
dominance of Northern over Southern States.
Professor Mutua's final substantive chapter focuses on
South Africa as a human rights state under its post-apart-
heid constitution. He uses this inquiry, which is quite well
documented, rich in examples and well-argued, to take on
the larger jurisprudential question of the limits of rights
discourse per se, a question already somewhat prominent in
CRT scholarship regarding rights-reversal in the United
States against African Americans and other peoples of
color. I will return shortly to ask whether this part of his
analysis is somewhat misdirected.
II. The Human Right to Freedom of Religion
Professor Mutua devotes two chapters to the human
right of freedom of religion, particularly as this right ap-
plies to African peoples, cultures, and states. Doubtless his
childhood experiences confronting imported religion in colo-
nial Kenya, as he sketches in the book's Introduction, are a
factor in his extended treatment of these questions. How-
ever, their intrinsic importance to human rights law,
particularly after 9/11, is sufficient justification.
Mutua's primary argument is that conventional West-
ern liberal interpretations of the right to freedom of relig-
ion, with its themes of diversity and difference, hide and
mask the protection of the religious establishments of
Christianity and Islam, especially as these religions were
introduced and established in Africa. These two religions,
with their close connections to colonial economic and politi-
cal processes, are thus protected as they seek to forcibly
destroy diversity and difference in religious beliefs by im-
posing their own religious orthodoxy. They are protected as
they violate the core values of diversity and difference at
the heart of this right to freedom of religion. Such protec-
tion has particularly undermined indigenous African relig-
ions, by denying them recognition equal to that granted to
Christianity and Islam.
Whereas the core legal issue for this right is usually
framed as one of "tolerance," like it was by the UN Special
518 [Vol. 52
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Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Mutua point-
edly reformulates it around the "superiority"-and its pro-
tection through rights interpretations-claimed and ef-
fected, in Africa and implicitly elsewhere in the third world,
of Christianity and Islam through their own operational
theologies over all other religions. Thus, proselytism in Af-
rica by Christians and Muslims constituted major human
rights violations, argues Mutua, and resulted in cultural
genocide by subverting and annihilating indigenous relig-
ions that were an inherent part of African customs, culture
and traditional society. By imposing their imported relig-
ious and social institutions and structures, the same actions
under these religions then denied Africans recognition
equal to that of Europeans and Muslims. Mutua notes that
many Africans today experience "identity disorientation"8
and "remain suspended between a dim African past and a
distorted, Westernized existence. Most have been robbed of
their humanity."9
The power of Mutua's argument rests not only on the
clarity with which he makes it, but also on the recognition
that it conveys to the informed reader, whether she agrees
with his conclusions or not. Such recognition stems in part
from Mutua's bringing fresh critical eyes to accepted doc-
trine, rather than defining new principles. Thus, for exam-
ple, Mutua agrees with the UN Special Rapporteur that re-
ligion, politics, and education intersect in many ways, with
education playing a vital role in respect to the establish-
ment of religion. Mutua, however, is demonstrating how
education was used as a sword to further religious intoler-
ance, while the Special Rapporteur is proposing that educa-
tion should be used as a shield to curtail religious intoler-
ance.
10
Moreover, Mutua provides in these chapters, probably
unintentionally, a powerful and concrete set of confirming
8. Id. at 114.
9. Id. at 110.
10. See Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance: Report of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 119(b), at 1 141, U.N.
Doc. A/58/296 (2003); see also Implementation of the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur, U.N. GAOR, 50th
Sess., Agenda Item 112(b), at J 82, U.N. Doc. A/50/440 (1995). The overall tenor
and structure of these reports rest on and assume the theoretical and actual in-
tersection of religion, politics, and education.
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examples to pertinent parts of the prominent New Haven
School of international jurisprudence, expounded by Profes-
sors McDougal and Lasswell in the mid-twentieth century."
Their analytical insight of the importance of ascertaining in
any community, including the international community,
who controls decisions about shaping principles and expec-
tations of right and wrong-which they called the value-
goal of "rectitude""2 -finds detailed confirmation in Mutua's
arguments and examples here about decisions controlling
that value in the intersections of the human rights process
with Northern tier colonial politics and traditional African
customs and religions. His narrative acquires more impor-
tance if we acknowledge the historically assigned task of
modern human rights law: to globally influence the shaping
of rectitude towards rights protection regarding the treat-
ment of all the world's people. In doing so, that law must
also prescribe rights-protective strategies to mediate indi-
vidual rights among the often competing values of recti-
tude, power, wealth, and human loyalty to states and cul-
tures.
We can also note in passing that this conjunction of
Mutua's CRT perspectives with the New Haven School is
yet another illustration of the utility of the latter to the
emergence of CRT. That School was, and remains one of
several available storehouses of interdisciplinary theory
and approaches to precisely defining the community cir-
cumstances of, and decisions operating on, peoples of color.
Mutua's main concern is that any interpretation of a
human right to freedom of religion must protect Africa's
and the world's indigenous religions, in part because these
peoples' cultures are at stake in their interchanges with the
more widely organized and recognized religions. In this
sense, he would divorce the recognition of particular relig-
ions under this human right from any modernist pre-condi-
tion for interpreting that right. He also argues that organ-
ized religions themselves, as non-state actors, have an
implied duty under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights to protect the rights of non-believers and
adherents to other religions. Here, Mutua is advancing a
11. See MYRES S. McDoUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980).
12. See id. at 130-31.
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new and potentially significant interpretation of this right
and its correlative duties, particularly in light of 9/11.
Mutua's Book, including these chapters, was completed
prior to the events of 9/11, thus denying him the opportu-
nity to extend his interpretation of the values of diversity
and difference against orthodoxy at the core of the right to
the implications of those tragic events. He might well agree
with the Special Rapporteur in this regard, who recently
stressed that official restrictions on freedom of religion are
not appropriate responses to terrorism, and that states
must not use "the pretext of security in response to terrorist
threats to limit"3 freedom of religion or belief. However,
Mutua would be vigilant for tacit alliances between any
particular religion and state power in a given country.
Ultimately, Mutua's arguments run into those scholars
and policymakers who, citing pragmatic and rough major-
ity-rule considerations, assert the impossibility of equally
protecting all religions great and small. They thus bring
forward, or assume, some criteria of state or community
recognition of particular religions, bringing in, often with-
out so admitting, considerations of race, dominance, mod-
ernism, and power against those religions to be denied rec-
ognition. Having shown the consequences in Africa of the
abuse of such recognition, Mutua's vision of the best inter-
pretation of the human right to freedom of religion now
awaits a more horizontal projection of how, post-9/11 and
under the modernistic surge of post-Cold War victor capi-
talism, indigenous and customary religions could effectively
be protected, and how the proselytism of large religions in
their orthodoxy that do get recognized might be limited.
III. DOES MUTUA'S NARRATIVE EXTEND TO CONSIDERING
WHETHER THERE IS A RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLE NOT TO BE KILLED
OR HURT?
It can be argued that we are now in mid-evolution of a
global principle that all persons have a right not to be
physically hurt by anyone, state or private person, with the
possible exemptions of the most legitimate police and mili-
tary action and the clearest possible individual cases of self
defense. Claims and arguments around this evolving prin-
13. Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance: Report of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur, supra note 10, at 139.
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ciple extend it to all vulnerable people in a particular com-
munity, such as women, children, and those otherwise dis-
criminated against. Their fate and pain can now be more
readily known in this globalized world as a closed system.
This evolution is also arguably being extended to pro-
tect all people against economic deprivation, especially by
economic withholding, and against spirit injury or spirit
murder, as Adrien Wing has so well discussed. Such an
evolving principle is a deep subtext to much current human
rights legal reasoning regarding what actions are permitted
and their relation to human pain. Mutua's book encom-
passes this sub-text without quite clarifying its relation to
it, especially regarding internal cultural authority and
permissible pain. Of course, there are many dissenters and
opponents of any such evolution, including those leaders or
officials who would push their own ideologies on communi-
ties, which, if implemented, would result in separating
whole groups of vulnerable people from community re-
sources, thus leaving them in destructive situations, in the
name of "good policy" or "market or resource imperatives."
And there is some "fatigue" of mobilized public shame at
people being killed for preventable reasons, lessening the
deterrent to those potentially so liable in the future.
But pain to or death of apparent innocent or vulnerable
people still brings a visible community reaction (except for
that of thoroughly demonized persons), perhaps because of
not only still embedded norms of decency, compassion, and
dignity, but also from the proliferation of horizontally and
vertically techno-enhanced ways of capturing its image and
showing individual death-and-wounded stories through the
media in real time to real people. This process can be ar-
gued to define the outward extension of the human right to
life, first codified in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 3.1" It has always been the case that this
right under international human rights law has a different,
more protective content than similar official language used
in domestic American discourse, for example, not being con-
14. See Adrien Katherine Wing, A Critical Race Feminist Conceptualization
of Violence: South African and Palestinian Women, in GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM 332, 333 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2000).
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("Everyone has the right to
life, liberty and security of person.").
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strained by the American abortion debate, but informing
the illegality of the death penalty.
This right to life is spreading left and right, to those
freeing themselves from the most deadly and stark oppres-
sion, and to those inflicting such oppression on well-known
ranges of victims and targets. It raises the question of
whether modern global society can exist without allowing
people to hurt and kill each other, governmentally or pri-
vately, or whether modernism writ large demands such
allowances of death as lubrication for its social, economic,
political and legal gears. It is a question that takes us, in its
affirmative, to Michael Taussig, the noted anthropologist,
and his writings about modern "spaces of death."' And in
its negative, it takes us to the works of Ghandi and Martin
Luther King, and to their demand that all of us have the
moral courage on the national and international planes to
exclude from the definition of "good policy" any need for
human death and harm. Further, it is a question that we
cannot be sure applies only to modern life-it may well ap-
ply in somewhat different ways to traditional cultures as
well.
Thus, must a CRT lens on the human rights process-
through which Professor Mutua is writing-extend its reach
to consider and assess a real and effective right to life to the
point of a community duty and an individual duty to pro-
hibit human death and harm? Do those persons actually
and metaphorically confined and oppressed as "savages" in
his Chapter 1, under the guise of universal rights protec-
tion, possess equally the right to be free from all humanly-
inflicted death and harm, and the duty to avoid inflicting
any of the same on their oppressive Northern "saviors,"
even to prevent the latter from continuing to "save" them?
In the recent past, versions of this issue, as between
colonizers and those peoples fighting, dying, and struggling
to liberate themselves, were crammed into the dyad under
the law of the United Nations Charter of "self defense
against armed (colonial) attack."17 Thus the death of colo-
16. See Michael Taussig, Culture of Terror-Space of Death: Roger
Casement's Putumayo Report and the Explanation of Torture, 26 COMP. STUD. IN
Soc'Y & HIST. 467, 467-97 (1984).
17. Compare ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 151 (1995), with MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, LAW AND THE ALGERIAN
REVOLUTION 57-58 (1961). See also TASLIM 0. ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 156-57 (1983).
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nizers to secure an end to that oppression, if it came to that,
was justifiable, as it had to be.18 Now, individual stories can
be readily and globally known, and the contest between the
horror of each death and the goodness of the liable cause
and justification is demanded to be re-balanced, even as the
frequency of deaths rises in post-Cold War conflicts internal
to states.
Even racial defense contexts-such as combating geno-
cide, enslavement, pervasive oppression, or quiet white
domination-are being called to limitation by claims of this
expanded right to life. Bishop Desmond Tutu wrote as much
in his final report of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission about the duties of both the Af-
rican National Congress (ANC) and the South African
apartheid regime to respect enemies' lives and dignity, not-
withstanding the clear moral superiority enjoyed by the
ANC. 9 And racial oppressors are prohibited even in their
subtle strategies, or "normal" modes of racial domination,
by norms from deconstructions, including CRT deconstruc-
tions. For example, their using rights-reversal to produce
cages of denial of benefits and justifications in the name of
"good policy" causes spirit injury and spirit murder for peo-
ples of color.
Clearly, this latter forms part of the CRT project in
North America. Just as clearly, it must be part of the global
CRT project for African-heritage peoples. From a perspec-
tive where Africans and African Americans concretely
inform each other, it is towards these vistas that Makau
Mutua takes us. Mutua lines out this journey with insight-
ful and pungent analysis, but in this book he does not quite
reach the dilemmas posed for people of color, in a post-
modern global community, by claims of an expanded human
right to life. He does come close in his evocations of "cul-
tural genocide." Western dominance of the global media
may well be a contributing stream of analysis to resolve
these dilemmas, as may be arguments about "asymmetrical
interpretations" of the right to life, compared to the basic
rights norms that Mutua sees as essential to preserve. In
any case, it is probable that Professor Mutua will be in the
18. See CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1226-29 (5th ed. 2001).
19. See 1 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report ch. 1,
1 52 (1999).
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forward echelons when these dilemmas are directly con-
fronted.
IV. MUTUA'S CHALLENGE TO THE CONTINUING AUTHORITY OF
RIGHTS DISCOURSE
We may ask whether Mutua's test of South Africa as a
"human rights state," in his final substantive chapter, is an
appropriate test of the continuing validity of international
human rights discourse as an international legal narrative,
and by implication, of the validity of rights discourse as a
general and national legal narrative.
Mutua's analysis of the continuing racial oppression of
the Black South African majority as probably the most
rights-protective in the world, especially in the continuation
of economic apartheid a decade after the epochal 1994 free-
dom elections and some eight years after the 1996 Constitu-
tion, is accurate, replete with cogent examples, and well-
documented. Mutua argues that the notion of "rights" as a
legal construction essential to protect vulnerable peoples is
now highly questionable, since it is failing in post-apartheid
South Africa. It is this argument that attracts our attention
here. Much of Mutua's argument for the failure, and im-
plicitly the abolition of rights discourse, rests on its short-
comings regarding economic entitlements, just allocation of
economic benefits, and the right to property. The latter has
long had a disputed history in the international human
rights corpus, with its appearance in the Universal
Declaration and its subsequent scarcity in other rights
documents.20
As an umbrella observation, economic rights currently
define perhaps the most sensitive, tendentious, difficult,
violent and sometimes deadly frontier in human rights law.
Constitutive assumptions and public orders of entire com-
munities in their current class structures, security of elites,
20. For a textually stated right to property, see Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 15, at 71. By contrast, this right does not appear as a
stated right in either the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force January 3,
1976), or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976). See also LoUIS
HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 234-37 (Supp. 2003) (showing the disputed
authority for the right to property); SHADRACK B. 0. GuTTO, PROPERTY AND LAND
REFORM: CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES (1995) (same).
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survival of common folk, and allocations of wealth and
power are potentially at stake. The historical contributions
of rights discourse, imperfect as it is, in facilitating libera-
tion struggles of vulnerable peoples to arrive at that pre-
cious historical point of simply confronting this jurispru-
dential and community frontier, to otherwise arrive at this
mountaintop and peer down into the jurisprudential valley,
are large and irreplaceable. Might we not continue to need
this discourse-appropriately and critically refined-to de-
fine future economic allocations under premises of justice so
they may effectively be protected for vulnerable people by
attracting the normative basis for implemented remedies at
law? But perhaps more limited questions should be tackled
first.
One such question is whether the serious doubts about
rights discourse, arising from rights-reversal aimed at Afri-
can Americans by white conservatives within the national
American constitutional jurisdiction,21 should be carried in-
tact to inform the analysis of the constitutive law of a na-
tional state, with a different racial equation that has
recently been re-organized around comprehensive legal
rights protection to shape its national future? Any such
question and transference brings us back to confront the
enormous historical utility to protect oppressed groups and
persons provided by the notion of "rights" under law. The
issue here is whether this historical utility is now so de-
stroyed that there is nothing in legal theory left to fix, and
thus the basic notion of "rights" to protect vulnerable
peoples must now be abandoned. If so, then some other ju-
risprudential notion must be found that promises to those
same peoples at least equivalently effective norms and enti-
tlements of benefits and protection from harm, as well as a
basis for community enforcement against discretionary
policy shifts and unpopularity. However, those who advo-
cate the end of rights discourse because of its failure-for
example, its susceptibility to rights-reversal-have not, to
date, provided its replacement.
Perhaps this lack of a replacement discourse stems
from the proposition that to provide one would be to admit
21. For a discussion of rights-reversal aimed at African Americans within
the national American constitutional jurisdiction, see the collected works by
various authors in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT 205-312 (Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
526 [Vol. 52
2004] UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
that Derrick Bell's notion of perpetual racism, and thus
perpetual rights struggle,22 is basically correct. And thus
that we can only hope for the good, equitable counter-poised
management of an Hegelian process over time under law, of
racism-struggle-equitable rights relief. This may well be
sufficiently depressing for those who in their lifetimes hope
for final durable conditions of liberation under law, national
and international, so as to end the production of new
theory. On the other hand, perhaps we should focus on an
interim question, raised by this book, on the transference of
the doubts about rights discourse from the American expe-
rience to the international/South African experience. Is
such transference appropriate to judge whether rights dis-
course has failed and should be cast aside?
To be sure, there are common issues on both sides of
this transference, even as there are large differences of
value-scope, scale, national state authority, and racial
demographics. Common to both is the question of whether
peoples of color tend to have equal or greater capacity to in-
voke and claim on existing rights of economic entitlement
and protection than their dominators. Particularly, whether
the latter tend to have greater international support to en-
able them to meet the legal conditions of, for example, a
constitutional/international human "right to property," and
also to meet their demands for enforcement of that same
right. Such situations were a common problem in post-
independence Southern African constitutions vis-a-vis
holdover European expatriate populations, who were sup-
ported in protecting "their property" against new African
governments and national majorities by ex-metropolitan
capitals. A version of this situation arguably continues to
exist in present-day South Africa, as illustrated by the hard
racial struggle around the drafting of the right to property
in the 1996 Constitution.23
However, rights discourse in international and then na-
tional law was absolutely crucial to destroying political
apartheid, producing the 1994 elections, and having the
current, though imperfect with regard to racial justice,
South African state in front of us to assess. No other notion
22. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE 3-10 (1987).
23. See GUTTO, supra note 20, at 59-67; see also SHADRACK B. 0. GUrrO,
HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS FOR THE OPPRESSED 77-82 (1993).
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of entitlement to freedom from oppression, as a matter of
law, existed and was available to be invoked as the center-
piece of the global anti-apartheid movement for a rolling
process of international community remedies, even if most
remedies were flawed to some degree.
Economic apartheid in South Africa is no less an inter-
national community question, even though there are
numerous white counter-claims around these issues that
often lack the pre-1994 starkness needed for effective
political mobilization of African-heritage and progressive
people. If it cannot be made clear that the African majority
has a legal and highly protected "right" to be free of eco-
nomic apartheid, how will the normative and legal founda-
tion of such freedom that will call people of justice to strug-
gle be constructed? Further, transference here, as between
states, or between national and international law, raises
another issue that goes to a possible replacement discourse
promising needed protection of African peoples' economic
entitlements.
If the argument for the bankruptcy of rights discourse
is sustained on the national level, it might be suggested
that some Weberian dynamic lodged in the modern bureau-
cratic state regarding government licenses and disburse-
ments would be an effective replacement regarding pre-
scribing and protecting economic resource "entitlements" in
some durable manner with available remedies. This seems
inherently dubious, and given the increasingly pervasive
questions about the rights-deficiencies of modern states
going into the twenty-first century, a dangerous historical
bet. But even if there is much merit in it, transferring this
proposed rights-replacement out of the relatively cozy
national command confines of the modern bureaucratic
state into the more open dynamics of international organ-
izational bureaucracy, or into states whose bureaucracies
lack competence, independence from political shifts and
winds, or durability and national acceptance, promises to
lose any prescriptive, invoking or implementing protections
for the persons posited as the beneficiaries of the sought-af-
ter "entitlements."
Here is not the place to finally resolve the questions
about the continuing adequacy and acceptance of rights dis-
course. However, it does seem appropriate to ask whether
Mutua's analysis, in his final chapter, of South Africa as a
human rights state does just as logically provide a valuable
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foundation for proposing needed changes in theory and
practice in rights discourse to address the particular chal-
lenges-the old colonial challenges as Antony Anghie and
B.S. Chimni point out 2 -of prescribing and protecting eco-
nomic rights to the same people who have struggled to
"win" political rights of governance. That is, with this chap-
ter Mutua can open a needed new jurisprudential narrative
to reinvigorate rights discourse, through economic and ra-
cial justice, both nationally and under transformed
international human rights law.
CONCLUSION
Professor Mutua has written a book that is critically
valuable for the international human rights process, and
whose insights spark much consideration for needed future
inquiry. His work may help re-write the spectrum of analy-
sis for the question of cultural relativism by insisting that
we take global cultural diversity seriously in terms of
equality of legal protection, and that we face up to those
implications through human rights legal prescription and
interpretation. This means making the legal history of
those cultures part of present-day legal analysis in interna-
tional human rights law. Deservedly, in light of the
excellence of its reasoning and the clarity of its writing, his
book has been favorably reviewed in several journals in
Africa and the United States.
Perhaps the final elements underpinning the value of
Professor Mutua's book are reflected in the consonance of
his work with that recently of Professor Antony Anghie,25 as
a prominent CRT scholar, and earlier, the work of Basil
Davidson, the notable scholar of African history.26 Anghie is
spelling out, compellingly, how the premises of nineteenth
century colonialism have embedded themselves quite well
in modern international law, not least to the detriment of
Africa and African-heritage peoples. And Davidson, in his
24. Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International
Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflict, in THE METHODS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 185, 191-94 (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter
eds., 2004).
25. See Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of
Governance in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887 (2000).
26. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE
OF THE NATION-STATE (1992).
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capstone work The Black Man's Burden, vividly demon-
strated the historical costs to Africa, including for its essen-
tial customs, cultures and traditional authority, of adopting
the European state structure as the language of African lib-
eration. Professor Mutua in this book has demanded, with
first-rate scholarship, that we recognize how international
human rights law must confront, and be transformed in the
present, by the historical consequences which Anghie and
Davidson show us.
